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 Commercial Bank Underwriting of Credit-Enhanced Bonds: 
Are There Certification Benefits to the Issuer? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Recent studies have expanded the commercial bank certification hypothesis to include 
banks acting in an underwriting capacity.  This paper further develops that research by focusing 
on the industrial revenue bond market in which banks have the unique opportunity to 
simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter.  When explicitly allowing for bank-
issued standby letters of credit (guarantees), we find significantly greater yield spreads for those 
bonds underwritten by commercial banks compared to bonds underwritten by investment banks.  
Overall, no net benefit appears to accrue to the bond issuer when attempting to achieve joint (or 
double) certification benefits by employing commercial banks as both credit guarantor and 
underwriters except in the special case where the same bank acts as both guarantor and 
underwriter. This limited certification effect is further validated when the credit quality of 
participating banks is accounted for. This result is consistent with an "economy of scope" in 
monitoring and reusing information. 
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Commercial Bank Underwriting of Credit-Enhanced Bonds: 
Are There Certification Benefits to the Issuer? 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Regulatory constraints on investment banking activities have severely limited the 
opportunity for studying the role of commercial banks as security underwriters in the United 
States.  Nevertheless, general findings to date suggest that smaller-sized firms that issue lower 
quality debt benefit most by having an underwriting relationship with a commercial bank.  
Specifically, Puri (1996) finds that commercial bank underwritings of corporate bonds, in the 
pre-Glass-Steagall Act period, resulted in better pricing for smaller and lower credit rated issuers 
than similar issues underwritten by investment banking firms.  Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter 
(1997) draw similar conclusions for bond offerings in the post-1987 period, when banks were 
allowed to use their Section 20 securities subsidiaries to engage in corporate bond underwritings.  
This study expands on the above research by examining the potential certification benefits, in 
terms of issuance costs, that (may) occur when commercial banks simultaneously act as both 
credit guarantor and underwriter in municipal bond financing transactions.  
Commercial banks are unique participants in the industrial revenue bond primary market 
as they frequently issue standby letters of credit, as a means of credit enhancement (or 
guarantee), and underwrite the actual bond offering itself.  Consequently, the issuance of a 
standby letter of credit backing by a commercial bank might be viewed as a positive signal 
regarding the quality of the borrower since the bank's issuance of the guarantee can be 
considered as certification of the borrower's credit quality.  Similar certification effects have 
been found with new loans and loan renewals (i.e. see James, 1987, for example).   Indeed, the 
municipal revenue bond market is well recognized for its high degree of information asymmetry 
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among issuers and investors.1  As a result, such certification services may be viewed as highly 
valuable. In addition, commercial banks concerned about reputation may also bring certification 
benefits to the issuer through the underwriting process (see Puri, 1996, for example). 
To examine the benefits of "double" certification, that is to examine the benefit to the 
issuer from using commercial banks as both standby letter of credit guarantors and underwriters, 
a sample of industrial revenue bond issues offered during the 1987-1998 period were segmented 
into a sub-samples containing those bonds with (without) standby letter of credit backing and 
underwritten by investment banks, and bonds with (without) standby letter of credit backing and 
underwritten by commercial banks.  Using these sample partitions, as well as identifying 
separate sub-samples where the same bank offered both services (as opposed to different banks 
offering the two services separately), the empirical tests focus on the market’s response to the 
type of underwriting undertaken.  The market’s response is measured by the size of the tax 
adjusted reoffering yields achieved by the issuer relative to matched maturity U.S. Treasury 
securities. 
Since a standby letter of credit-backed bond is essentially a transaction-based loan in 
which a bank's guarantee provision cannot be inferred as indicative of a long-term banking 
relationship, and thus a long term monitoring role, any certification benefit may be small.2  
Indeed, if the market only reacts favorably to the credit provision (contingent or otherwise) via a 
long-term lending relationship (and the monitoring role that this implies), there may be little 
significant difference between yields on bonds backed by standby letters of credit and those 
without such credit enhancement.  Of course, the market may still view the guarantee favorably,  
                                                 
1 See Robbins, Apostolou and Strawser (1985), and Ingram, Raman and Wilson (1989). 
2 See Berger and Udell (1995). 
 4
irrespective of the degree of monitoring of the guarantee provider (the bank), as long as the 
credit quality of the guarantee provider is superior to that of the bond issuer.  In this case, a 
positive spread saving should be observed between those issues utilizing guarantees and those 
not utilizing guarantees.  In other words, the pure “insurance role” of guarantees would dominate 
the absence of significant benefits from (any) long term bank monitoring. 
 In addition to the certification effect inherent in the decision to employ a standby letter of 
credit, the municipal issuer must also choose among alternative underwriting options.  In particular, 
a municipality's choice-set of underwriter includes both traditional investment banking firms and 
commercial banks.  Controlling for the guarantee effects of letters of credit, we examine the relative 
degree to which the reputation of the commercial bank and investment banker adds to the value of 
an issue via reoffering yield spreads.  Indeed, in bringing an issue to market, the underwriter 
(whether an investment bank or commercial bank) will carry out information collection activities.  
In part, the reputation of the underwriter reflects the quality of this information monitoring and 
collection function over time. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the industrial 
revenue bond market.  Section 3 presents data and the basic empirical model.  Section 4 
discusses the empirical results.  Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
2. Industrial Revenue Bond  Market 
Industrial revenue bonds provide a means of tax exempt financing that has been used by a 
variety of corporations to fund the construction or acquisition of projects.  Some form of 
governmental unit, ranging from a city to an issuing authority, provides the conduit through which 
the municipality issues the bonds on behalf of the corporation.  In turn, the corporation pledges to 
pay the interest and principal on the bond usually in the form of a lease or loan agreement 
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between the corporation and the issuing organization.  In lease arrangements, rental payments are 
used to make the required debt interest and principal payments.  The lease/purchase format 
allows the corporation to take advantage of applicable depreciation guidelines (and tax credits) 
as well as being able to deduct interest payments as a business expense.  When bonds are paid 
off, a corporation may assume title to the project itself for a nominal fee.  The underlying legal 
agreement with the municipality is typically at the corporate level, as opposed to the project 
(bond) level, which places bondholders in an unsecured position against the revenues of the 
corporation.  Additional security in the form of mortgage liens on the underlying project property 
or relet provisions under a lease agreement often enhance the bond's structure.3 
This form of tax exempt debt exhibits certain features.  The interest rate may range from 
a seven-day variable rate to a long-term fixed rate for 15-20 year maturities.  Corporate backed 
issues typically trade at higher taxable equivalent yields than similar unsecured taxable debt of 
the same corporation.  Principal repayment terms are often flexible and are structured to fit the 
unique cash flows of the company.  The bonds are usually not callable for a minimum of three 
years. 
Particularly, when the industrial revenue bonds are publicly traded, a commercial bank 
may provide credit enhancement via a standby letter of credit.  The standby letter of credit 
provides additional security to the bond investor.  The bank substitutes its credit worthiness for 
that of its client (the issuer) to increase the attractiveness of the offering.  The bank issuing the 
standby letter of credit is committed to paying the interest and principal on the bonds if the issuer 
                                                 
3 This study does not explicitly allow for such internal credit enhancements for two reasons.  
First, such information is not generally available from the sources employed.  Second, the 
specific value of such credit enhancements are difficult to measure because their respective 
values depend on the economic value of the asset, the transferability of the asset's use and the 
location of the asset. 
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fails to do so.  With the employment of the standby letter, the issuer agrees, under a 
reimbursement agreement, to repay the bank for any draw-downs under the standby letter of 
credit agreement. Thus, the issuer expects to lower the interest cost on its borrowings.  The bank 
may also designate whether additional collateral is required as security.  Typically, the 
commercial bank issuing the standby letter must be rated investment grade or better.  Moreover, 
the bank providing the standby letter of credit is often not the underwriter, i.e., the bond may be 
underwritten by another bank (investment or commercial). 
Table 1 illustrates the relative importance of net issues in the municipal bond market in 
the context of all the other forms of public and private debt in the United States over the 1989-
1998 period.4  Until recently, the Treasury securities market represented the largest segment of 
the new issue debt market.  However, reflecting, among other things federal budget surpluses, 
the net size of the Treasury bond market is actually declining.  The average net funds raised in 
the municipal bond market totaled $38.55 billion per year over the 1989-1998 period. 
(Insert Table 1) 
3. Sample and Empirical Methodology  
 A.  Sample of Industrial Revenues Bonds   
 The sample of industrial revenue and pollution control bonds for this study was selected 
from all issues reported by Moody's Bond Record for the period 1987-1998.5  Before the late 
1980’s, few industrial revenue or pollution control bonds were supported by standby letters of  
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, there is no aggregate data specifically on the volume of industrial revenue bond 
financing over this same time period.  
5 In 1987, the Federal Reserve specifically allowed Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial bank 
holding companies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. 
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credit and/or underwritten by commercial banks.  Development of the sample began by 
identifying those issues with fixed coupon rates for the life of the bond.  Thus, both floating and 
variable coupon bonds were excluded.  We also excluded those issues for which a complete set 
of variables required for the yield spread tests was unavailable.  The required variables included 
the tax adjusted premium (spread) between the municipal bond reoffering yield and a 
comparable maturity U.S. Treasury security, issue size, maturity, identification of the lessee, 
standby letter of credit issuing bank, underwriting firm, the credit rating of the standby letter of 
credit issuing bank, the maturity of the line of credit, and bond rating.  The Appendix to the 
paper presents the sources of data and the approach used to measure the tax adjusted yield spread 
or premium.  Our premium measure consists of the tax exempt industrial revenue bond 
reoffering yield, adjusted for both federal and state income taxes, less the U.S. treasury interest 
rate, adjusted for state income taxes. 
 The final sample consisted of 1003 issues.  Sub-samples include 665 issues which had no 
standby letter of credit backing and were underwritten by a traditional investment banker, 146 in 
which a commercial bank had issued the standby letter of credit but a traditional investment 
banker underwrote the offering, 82 issues in which commercial banks issued the standby letter of 
credit but also underwrote the issue and finally 110 issues in which there was no line of credit 
but a commercial bank underwrote the offering.  Of the 82 issues in which commercial banks 
provided both services, a total of thirty-six issues employed the same commercial bank in both 
functions.  Finally, there was no discernable trend over the period of our study in the frequency 
of commercial bank versus investment bank underwritings or in the proportion of sample bond 
offerings with standby letter of credit backing. 
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 B.  Empirical Tests and Model Parameters 
 Our primary test is to examine whether offering spreads differentiate between those 
issues underwritten by commercial banks and those by investment banks. This is examined both 
with and without the standby letter of credit variable in the model.  Subsequent tests examine 
whether a commercial bank and investment banker's reputation has a significant impact on the 
determination of offering spreads.  Finally, employing the sample in which the same bank 
provided both the standby letter of credit and underwriting services, we explicitly test the 
tradeoff between joint certification benefits and any possible conflict of interest effects when the 
same bank provides both services for the issuer.6  In this case, considering the findings of Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (1995), we also analyze whether our results may be affected by the 
quality of the participating bank.   
 The dependent variable, PREMIUM, is the yield on the municipal bond minus the yield 
to maturity for a comparable maturity U.S. government bond issued in the same month.  The 
Appendix explains how tax adjustments are made to both securities to present them on a 
comparable “yield” basis.  Determinants of the yield spread are assumed to be those variables 
specified on the right hand side of equation (1) and described below:  
 
PREMIUM = β0 + β1BANK + β2LETTER + β3RATING + β4SIZE + 
β5MATURITY + β6LIST + β7PREVIOUS + β8REPUTATION + 
β9SUPPLY + β10TRATE + ε                                                                (1)  
in which: 
                                                 
6 Such conflicts may be driven by banks seeking to boost their “fee income” and current 
earnings. 
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 PREMIUM Stated tax adjusted yield to maturity of the municipal bond minus 
the yield to maturity on U.S. government bond of nearest 
maturity issued in the same month.  (see Appendix) 
 BANK A binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the bond is 
underwritten by a commercial bank and 0 if not 
 LETTER A binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the bond is backed 
by a commercial bank standby letter of credit and 0 if not. 
 RATING Moody's credit rating equal to 20 for AAA-rated bonds; 19 for 
AA1, and so on. 
 SIZE The $ size of the issue in millions. 
 MATURITY Number of months to maturity. 
 LIST A binary variable that assumes a value of 1 for those issuers 
(lessees) that are listed on a stock exchange and 0 if otherwise. 
 PREVIOUS A binary variable equal to 1 if the municipal entity has issued the 
same type of security before and 0 if otherwise. 
 REPUTATION The reputation of the investment banker underwriting the bond 
based on average level of co-managed or managed underwriting 
of industrial revenue bond offerings.  For commercial banks, the 
measure is a binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the 
issuing entity is a Section 20 subsidiary and 0 if otherwise.  
 SUPPLY Volume of revenue bonds sold in same month as sample. 
 TRATE U.S. Treasury bond rate for issue comparable in maturity  
 to that of the sample offering. 
 
 The first variable, RATING, is the Moody's bond rating measured according to the scale 
employed by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995).7  This 
variable is orthogonalized by employing the residual from the regression of RATING on the 
LETTER and TRATE variables.  Controlling for LETTER allows us to measure the independent 
credit assessment effect of the rating agencies while controlling for TRATE reflects the findings 
of Duffee (1998) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) that the yield spreads on corporate bonds, 
over comparable maturity Treasury securities, fall when the Treasury bill rates rise.8  The 
LETTER variable is also orthogonalized by using the residual from the regression of LETTER 
                                                 
7 These values are 20(AAA), 19(AA1), 18 (AA2), 17(AA3), 16(A1), 15(A2), 14(A3), 13(BBB1), 
12(BBB2), 11(BBB3), 10(BB1), and 9(BB2).  None of the ratings were below BB. 
8 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) conclude that such a relationship can be attributed to the 
negative correlation between firms’ asset values and default-free interest rates. 
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on the issue size, maturity and previous issue variables to recognize the impact that the latter 
variables may have on the decision of the firm to utilize a standby letter of credit. 
 Table 2 presents these first stage results.  The F statistics are highly significant for both 
the RATING (Panel A) and LETTER (Panel B) regressions.  As expected, the use of the standby 
letter of credit as a form of credit enhancement raises the bond rating by 2.83 points on the 
numerical rating scale (see footnote 6).  This is a sizeable effect given the average rating of 14.60 
for the entire sample.  The coefficients for the LETTER regression (Panel B) are also significant 
with the expected signs.  Municipal bonds are less likely to include a standby letter of credit if 
the issue is relatively large, if the lessee is listed on a major exchange and, finally, if the same 
type of bond had been issued previously by the current issuer. 
(Insert Table 2) 
 The PREMIUM model employs the size of the offering, SIZE, as a measure of 
marketability and potential scale economies in the underwriting process.  The coefficient for 
MATURITY, the natural log of bond years to maturity, is expected to be positive due to the 
typically positive yield curve for municipal bond yields.  Puri (1996) included a binary variable 
to recognize whether the offering was considered a new issue.  Thus, the variable, PREVIOUS, 
is set equal to one if, according to Moody's Bond Record, no other offering was made by the 
issuer in the past with the same characteristics and zero otherwise.  This distinction is based on a 
review of Moodys Bond Record for the 25 years prior to each offering in the sample.   The 
variable, SUPPLY, measures the volume of revenue bond offerings in the same month as the 
sample debt offering according to the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  The level of the U.S. Treasury 
security rate is included based on the findings of both Duffee (1998) and Longstaff and Scwartz 
(1995).  We employ the variable, LIST, as a proxy for the degree of public information regarding 
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the borrowers, which is equal to one if the lessee is a publicly traded company and zero 
otherwise. 
 In previous research, different measures of reputation have been employed.  Carter and 
Manaster (1990) used the relative placement of underwriters in (stock offering) tombstone 
announcements.  In contrast, Megginson and Weiss (1991) used the relative market share of 
managing underwriters as their reputation measure.  This study employs the latter approach for 
the subsample of bonds underwritten by investment banks.  Using the Securities Industry 
Yearbook, the underwriting firms are ranked according to the percentage of yearly volume of 
municipal debt offerings in which the investment banker either sole or co-managed the offering.  
Following the approach of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1997), the reputation measure is averaged 
over the measurement period.  Similar information is not readily available to gauge the 
reputation of commercial banks as municipal bond underwriting firms.  We use, as a proxy 
measure of reputation, the cumulative number of months that the bank's parent holding company 
operated a Section 20 subsidiary with the power to underwrite municipal revenue securities.  
This variable is formed by the interaction between the dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
holding company has a Section 20 subsidiary and zero if not times the number of months 
between the date it was established and the month of the revenue bond offering.  
4.  Empirical Results 
 Table 3 presents the mean values for PREMIUM and the explanatory variables from 
Equation 1.  Specifically, Table 3 shows that the yield spread for the industrial revenue bonds 
underwritten by commercial banks was on average 1.71 basis points higher than those for 
investment bank offerings (i.e., 33.15 basis points versus 31.44 basis points).  Consistent with the 
evidence from corporate bond underwritings (see Gande et. al., 1997), issues underwritten by 
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commercial banks were much smaller in size.  The average bond rating was also higher for 
bonds underwritten by banks.  The difference in the LIST variable suggests that investment 
banks were more likely to underwrite the revenue bonds of publicly traded firms.  Overall, 
irrespective of the underwriter, standby letter of credit backing lowered spreads by 4.93 basis 
points (27.89 versus 32.82).  Similar to those issues underwritten by commercial banks, issues 
with bank standby letters of credit tended to be smaller, with shorter maturities and a higher 
credit rating.  The results for PREVIOUS suggest that issuers in this market for the first time 
were more inclined to use a standby letter of credit as well as employ a commercial bank as the 
underwriting firm.  Finally, both commercial banks as underwriters and investment banks were 
more likely to use a standby letter of credit for those issues in which the lessee was unlisted and 
there had been no previous issues (i.e., those issues in which the greatest information asymmetry 
existed between issuers and underwriters).  
(Insert Table 3) 
 These univariate comparisons raise important questions regarding the net benefit of 
merely employing commercial banks as both credit guarantors and underwriters.  Indeed, those 
issuers utilizing commercial banks in both functions appear to have the highest average yield 
spreads.  However, such a conclusion is suspect given the differences in the subsamples as 
shown in Table 3.  Those issues which employed commercial banks in both functions were also 
the smallest ($3.27 million) and had the shortest average maturity (127.51 months).  The shorter 
maturity suggest a lower yield as municipal bonds typically exhibit an upward sloping yield 
curve.  Further, this subsample of issues was most susceptible to asymmetric information effects 
in that none involved exchange-listed lessees and only five were similar to previous issues.  
Therefore, controlling for these effects using the multivariate approach, as shown in Equation 1, 
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is essential for drawing firm conclusions regarding the benefits or costs of relying exclusively on 
a commercial bank for both functions.  
Table 4 presents OLS regression results for the yield premium model employed in 
Equation (1).  The positive coefficient for maturity reflects a rising yield spread with maturity for 
municipal bonds.  Similar to Gande, et al. (1997) and Puri (1996), the regression results show 
that the orthogonalized credit rating variable has a significant impact on yield premia – the 
higher the rating the lower the yield spread. The sign for the Treasury security rate is also 
negative and significant as might be expected given previous studies showing the credit yield 
spread to be negatively related to the level of rates.  Interestingly, a month of high supply 
(SUPPLY) of municipal offerings doesn't lead to a crowding out effect in that yield spreads are 
marginally lower in high issue months.  Finally, the LIST and PREVIOUS variables have 
statistically insignificant effects in the regressions in Table 4. 
(Insert Table 4) 
With respect to the effect of commercial bank underwriting and overall certification, the 
variable BANK1 is unity if a commercial bank provides a standby letter of credit but the bond is 
underwritten by an investment bank, and zero if not.  BANK2 is unity if a commercial bank 
provides both a standby letter of credit and underwrites the issue.  The coefficient for BANK1 is 
significantly negative and implies a 5.77 basis point reduction in spreads compared to those 
offerings in which there was no standby letter of credit backing of issues underwritten by 
investment banks.  Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient for BANK2 implies a net 
increase in yield spreads of 3.83 basis points when the issuer elects to employ a commercial bank 
as the underwriter of bonds and commercial banks are providers of standby letter of credit 
backing.  These results suggest that the certification effect, emanating from an investment bank 
 14
as underwriter, strongly dominates the certification effect from commercial bank underwritings, 
even in the presence of standby letters of credit issued by commercial banks. 
 Table 5 splits the total sample according to bond maturity and issue size.  Previous 
studies (i.e. see Gande et. al., 1999, for example) have shown that commercial banking 
relationships are particularly important for smaller firms.  The samples were split according to 
the median issue size and maturity, respectively.  In Table 5, while the negative coefficient of 
BANK1 for the smaller issues is less than that for the large issues, both large and small firms 
benefit from the employment of the standby letter of credit along with the choice of an 
investment banker as the underwriter.  The reductions in yield premiums of 7.71 and 5.32 basis 
points respectively for large and smaller firms, are both highly significant.  By contrast, the 
coefficients for BANK2 show that, while large issuer yield spreads are negatively, but 
insignificantly, impacted by commercial banks supplying both letter of credit and underwriting 
services, the opposite is true for small firms whose yield spreads appear to be significantly 
affected in the positive direction when banks are underwriters.  This increase of 6.15 basis points 
more than offsets the yield spread reduction caused by the use of the bank standby letter of 
credit.   Regarding issue maturity, the BANK1 coefficient is only significant for the long 
maturities while BANK2 is only significant for short maturities. 
(Insert Table 5) 
 Table 6 presents regressions where the total sample is segmented according to whether 
the issue was underwritten by a commercial bank or a traditional investment bank while 
separating those issues backed and not backed by standby letters of credit.  As can be seen, the 
need for a commercial bank to issue a standby letter of credit to back a commercial bank 
underwriting is viewed adversely rather than favorably by the market.  While the coefficient is 
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marginally significant, a higher spread is demanded by investors on such issues.  This is 
consistent with the bank needing to credit-enhance weaker issues, with this enhancement 
appearing to signal a lower quality issue to investors.   Indeed, the issues underwritten by a 
commercial bank without a standby letter of credit are received more favorably by the market 
(i.e., have lower spreads).  Note that, in contrast, a commercial bank-supplied standby letter of 
credit to back an investment bank underwriting is viewed as a favorable signal of quality and 
spreads are lower with standby letter of credit backing than without by 6.13 basis points.  
(Insert Table 6) 
 Previous research (i.e., Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) has 
examined the role of the underwriting firm reputation in the pricing of security offerings.  With 
respect to the industrial revenue bond market, the reputation of the investment banker appears to 
have an insignificant effect on spreads, given the presence of the standby letter of credit.  The 
opposite is true in the commercial bank sample.  The coefficient for the variable reputation for 
commercial banks is significantly negative, indicating that the better the reputation of the 
commercial bank the stronger the certification emanating from the standby letter of credit is 
likely to be.  That is, the results for high reputation commercial banks (i.e., those banks with 
Section 20 subsidiaries in the sample period) more closely conform to those of investment 
banks.9 
 Thus far, we have not distinguished between the cases when the same commercial bank 
supplies both standby letter of credit and underwriting services as opposed to different 
commercial banks.  However, using the subsample of eighty two issues that received standby 
                                                 
9 Following the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act in late 1999, municipal 
securities underwriting could be undertaken by the investment banking subsidiaries of newly 
established Financial Service Holding Companies once they were established. 
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letter of credit backing and underwriting services by commercial banks, it is possible to analyze 
independently the benefits and costs of joint certification by the same bank.  Table 7 presents the 
results of a regression analysis similar to those in Tables 4-6.  The LIST variable is excluded 
because none of the firms involved in these financings were exchange listed.  A new variable, 
SAMEBANK, is equal to one when both services are provided by the same bank and zero 
otherwise.  As noted earlier, thirty six of the eighty two issues employed the same bank to 
provide both services. The significantly negative coefficient for SAMEBANK in Table 7 
suggests that employing a single bank to provide both services reduces the yield premium by 
6.59 basis points.  Thus, the evidence favors the presence of joint certification benefits.  That is, 
any perceived conflicts of interest arising from the joint provision of these services are 
considered to be small compared to the strength of the positive certification signal that emanates 
from joint (double) certification by the same bank.  This result is particularly relevant given that 
Table 3 shows that employing any combination of commercial banks, irrespective of their 
identity, for both functions was the most expensive option. 
(Insert Table 7) 
 Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) found that the identity of the lending institution, as 
evidenced by the credit rating on its subordinated debt, influenced the market response to a loan 
announcement.  This raises the question as to whether the significance of the SAMEBANK 
variable is confirmation of a "double" certification effect or merely reflects the credit quality of 
the participating bank.  To examine this issue, we identify the Moody's credit rating for each 
bank's unsecured debt at the time of the revenue bond issue.  Each rating is converted to the same 
20 point scale used in our RATING variable.  We used two approaches to measure this potential 
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credit quality effect.10  First, we added BANKRATING as a new explanatory variable in tests of 
Equation 1 in Table 4.  The coefficient is significantly negative thus illustrating there is a 
legitimate reduction in the bond yield PREMIUM caused by the credit reputation of the bank.  
More importantly for our study, this inclusion of BANKRATING does not alter the significance 
of the SAMEBANK variable.  An alternative approach to measuring this credit effect is to 
include BANKRATING in the first stage equation for estimating the orthogonalized RATING 
variable on the premise that using higher quality banks as underwriters leads to a higher rating 
for the revenue bond.  BANKRATING has a significantly positive effect on the issue rating. 
Nevertheless, even when using this revised rating variable in Table 7, SAMEBANK remained 
statistically significant.  
 A final robustness check of the SAMEBANK finding of a cost saving (in terms of yield 
spread) for issuers that use the same bank to both issue the standby letter of credit and to 
underwrite the debt is to examine the effects on yield premia of first time municipal debt 
offerings.  Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1999) found that bank monitoring has a unique effect 
on the yield premia of first time public debt offerings by helping to lower the agency costs of 
public debt.  In our study, those issues with no previous issuance by the municipal entity/lessee 
(PREVIOUS = 0) may exhibit a unique "IPO" type spread premium. We examined the 
PREMIUM/SAMEBANK model for the subsample in which PREVIOUS = 0 to test for this 
possible effect.  Interestingly, the SAMEBANK coefficient remained negative and significant, 
further confirming the existence of a joint, or double, certifying effect when the same 
commercial bank is employed to both provide the standby letter of credit and underwrite the 
bond issue.  
                                                 
10  These regression results, excluded for space reasons, are available from the authors. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 The preponderance of literature examining the role of the credit markets in the U.S. 
financial system has focused on bank loan and corporate debt markets.  However, as shown in 
Table 1, the municipal debt market is close to rivaling each of these markets in terms of new 
issue volume.  A major component of the municipal debt market consists of industrial revenue 
bond financing that uniquely combines the credit granting function of commercial banks with the 
underwriting function of both investment banks and commercial banks. 
 Specifically, this paper has employed data from the industrial revenue bond new issue 
market to examine the size and value, in terms of offering spreads, of using commercial banks as 
both underwriters and suppliers of contingent credit guarantees.  In theory, both activities have 
certification value for the issuer.  The value of these services is benchmarked against a sample of 
issues that have been underwritten by investment banks, both with and without standby letter of 
credit backing. 
 The results suggest that the use of commercial banks, as both underwriters and credit 
guarantors, might actually be harmful (result in higher spreads) to issuers except in the special 
case where the same bank offers both services jointly.  This latter result is consistent with the 
gains from double certification dominating any potential conflicts of interest that may arise  
when the same bank jointly offers both services.  Overall, however, those issues underwritten by 
investment banks (with or without credit guarantees) are most favorably received – suggesting 
the continuing importance (in terms of value) of traditional investment banker certification on 
issuer spreads and new issue costs. 
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Appendix 
 The yield premium used in this analysis must recognize the respective tax effects on both 
the industrial revenue bonds and matched maturity treasury bonds.  That premium, PREMIUM, 
can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 PREMIUM    =       (Ym / 1- Fr – Sr) – (Yt / 1 –Sr) 
 
In which Ym and Yt are the reoffering yield on the industrial revenue bond and yield on 
comparable maturity U.S. Treasury bond.  Fr and Sr are the federal and state income tax rates. 
 We employed the maximum federal income tax rate as reported for the years of the study.  
For state tax rates, we used the maximum income tax rate for head of family and married persons 
filling separate returns.  The source for the state tax rates was the published list by the management 
consulting firm Grant Thorton. 
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Table 1 
Public and Private Credit Market Borrowing in the United States, 1989-1998 
(in $ billions) 
 
           
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
           
U.S. Treasury 
securities 
144.7 230.7 292 303.8 248.3 155.7 142.9 146.6 23.2 -47.4 
           
Corporate bonds 73.8 47.1 78.8 67.6 75.2 23.3 73.3 72.5 90.7 135.3 
           
Bank loans 41.5 5.5 -31.8 -8.9 -7.2 62.9 114.7 92.1 129.3 118.6 
           
Municipal securities 
and loans 
52.9 49.3 87.8 30.5 74.8 -35.9 -48.2 2.6 71.4 100.3 
           
           
Source:  Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System 
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Table 2 
First Stage Results for Standby Letter of Credit and Bond Rating Determination 
 
 
LETTER is one if the bond issue has a standby letter of credit and zero if not.  Issue size is in millions of 
dollars.  List equals one if the lessee involved in the bond offering is listed on a major exchange, zero if 
not.  Previous is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  Treasury rate is 
the interest rate on a comparable maturity Treasury bond at the date of the bond offering. 
 
    
Panel A: Bond Rating 
    
 Variable   Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 16.994 30.16 .001 
    
Letter of credit 2.832 14.89 .001 
    
Treasury rate -0.047 5.47 .001 
    
    
Adjusted R2 .203    
F-statistic 128.67    
P-value .001    
N = 1003    
    
    
Panel B: Letter of Credit (LETTER) Usage 
    
 Variable   Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 0.587 35.98 .001 
    
Issue size+ -0.797 2.82 .005 
    
LIST -0.395 18.43 .001 
    
Previous -0.265 12.54 .001 
    
    
Adjusted R2 .436    
F-statistic 259.19    
P-value .001    
N = 1003    
+ x107    
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Table 3 
Sample Characteristics of Industrial Revenue and Pollution Control Bonds 
 
Sample consists of 1003 issues over period 1987-1998 for which the interest rate on each bond was fixed and data was available.  PREMIUM is the 
reoffering yield less the rate on a comparable maturity US government bond which has been adjusted for differences in state tax policy in terms of basis 
points.  Both yields are adjusted for federal and state taxes.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in years, 
respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of 
industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same 
bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  The mean comparison first tests for equal/unequal variances and then use the appropriate t-test. 
 
    Underwriter         
   
Underwriter 
Commercial 
Bank 
Investment  
Bank 
Standby Letter  
of Credit 
 
t-Statistics 
  
Total 
Sample 
Mean 
 
Commercial 
Bank 
(192) 
 
Investment 
Bank 
(811) 
Letter 
of 
Credit 
(82) 
No 
Letter 
of 
Credit 
(110) 
Letter 
of 
Credit 
(146) 
No 
Letter 
of 
Credit 
(665) 
 
 
Yes 
(228) 
 
 
No 
(775) 
1, 2 3, 4 3, 5 4, 6 5, 6 7, 8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)       
                
PREMIUM 
(Basis points) 
31.77 33.15 31.44 35.35 29.97 22.49 32.90 27.89 32.82 2.16** 2.51** 5.25*** 0.69 4.35*** 2.33** 
                
ISSUE SIZE 
($millions) 
22.31 7.43 22.40 3.27 9.29 4.20 26.19 4.35 24.43 6.77** 3.22*** 0.20 4.70*** 13.57*** 14.00*** 
                
MATURITY 
(months) 
249.65 180.46 255.27 127.51 213.97 177.03 270.08 163.16 264.14 8.60*** 7.26*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 8.98*** 13.40*** 
                
RATING1 14.60 15.05 14.22 16.57 13.90 16.65 13.66 16.67 13.75 4.95*** 9.50*** 1.13 1.84* 18.97*** 22.55*** 
                
SUPPLY 
($millions) 
 9982  9505  9673  8852  9560  9193  9664  9281  9746 0.53 1.23 0.32 1.01 0.28 0.76 
                
LIST Yes  560  96  464  0  96  6  458  6  554       
 No  443  96  347  82  14  140  207  222  221 3.28* 143.13*** 3.46* 15.68*** 205.12*** 338.68*** 
                
PREVIOUS
 Yes 
 
 460 
 
 54 
 
 405 
 
 5 
 
 49 
 
 1 
 
 405 
 
 6 
 
 454 
      
 No  543  138  406  77  61  145  260  222  321 30.09*** 34.35*** 6.00** 10.41*** 173.64*** 222.11*** 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
1See scale in footnote 6.  
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Table 4 
Effect on Yield Premium of Commercial Bank as 
Providers of Standby Letter of Credit and Underwriting Services 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = β0 + β1 Bank1 + β2 Bank2 + β3 Supply + β4 Issue Size + β5 Maturity + β6 Rating + β7 List  
+ β8 Previous + β9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond 
and the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  Bank1 is a 
variable which is a one when there is a standby letter of credit but the issue is underwritten by an 
investment bank, and zero if not.  Bank2 is a variable which is a one when the commercial bank both 
provides the standby letter of credit and serves as the lead underwriter.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY 
are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond 
rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount 
of industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major 
exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if 
not.  Treasury rate is the interest rate on the Treasury bond at the time of offering.  All are White’s 
adjusted. 
 
    
 Variable   Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 65.113 11.60 .000 
    
Bank1 -5.769 3.35*** .005 
    
Bank2 3.828 1.84** .049 
    
Supply+ -0.737 4.75*** .001 
    
Issue size 0.001 0.47 .701 
    
Maturity 0.015 2.87*** .006 
    
Rating -1.641 8.57*** .001 
    
List -0.956 0.79 .412 
    
Previous 0.986 0.89 .323 
    
Treasury rate -0.377 6.04*** .001 
    
 
Observations 1003 
Adjusted R2 0.129 
F-value 17.46 (p = .001) 
+ x103 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Effects of Issue Size and Maturity on the Bank Variable Determinants of the Yield Premium  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = β0 + β1 Bank1 + β2 Bank2 + β3 Supply + β4 Issue Size + β5 Maturity + β6 Rating + β7 List  
+ β8 Previous + β9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond 
and the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  Bank1 is a 
variable which is a one when there is a standby letter of credit but the issue is underwritten by an 
investment bank, and zero if not.  Bank2 is a variable which is a one when the commercial bank both 
provides the standby letter of credit and serves as the lead underwriter.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY 
are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond 
rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount 
of industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major 
exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if 
not.  Treasury rate is the interest rate on the Treasury bond at the time of offering.  P-values are in 
parentheses.  All are White’s adjusted. 
 
 Large Size Small Size Long Maturity Short Maturity 
     
Intercept 70.178 66.521 82.845 62.789 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
Bank1 -7.712** -5.322** -11.945*** -3.535 
 (.038) (.021) (.005) (.129) 
     
Bank2 -5.149 6.147** 1.021 4.678** 
 (.169) (.011) (.816) (.035) 
     
Supply+ -0.748*** -0.774*** -0.845*** -0.797*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
Issue size 0.001 0.001** -0.001 0.001** 
 (.861) (.023) (.387) (.021) 
     
Maturity 0.009 0.024*** -0.001 0.006 
 (.264) (.005) (.955) (.684) 
     
Rating -1.769*** -1.431*** -1.583*** -1.749*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
List -0.339 -0.976 -2.117 0.550 
 (.793) (.638) (.219) (.756) 
     
Previous 2.195* .031 3.552*** -3.004* 
 (.060) (.987) (.002) (.062) 
     
Treasury rate -0.424*** -0.385*** -0.512*** -0.330*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.119 0.182 0.113 
F-Statistic 10.83 8.51 13.22 8.17 
N 499 503 495 508 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
+ x103
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Table 6 
Examination of Interaction between Standby Letter of  
Credit Issuance and Underwriter Reputation on Yield Premium 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = β0 + β1 Letter 1 + β2 Reputation 2 + β3 Supply + β4 Issue Size + β5 Maturity + β6 Rating + β7 
List + β8 Previous + β9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
PREMIUM is the reoffering yield less the rate on a comparable maturity US government bond which has 
been adjusted for differences in state tax policy in terms of basis points.  Both yields are adjusted for 
federal and state taxes.  LETTER is one if the issue has a standby letter of credit and zero if not.  
REPUTATION refers the reputation of the commercial banks and investment bank as specified in the 
text.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in years, respectively; 
RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  
SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month.  LIST equals one 
if lessee is listed on major exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was 
previously offered, zero if not.  P-values are in parentheses.  All values are White’s adjusted. 
 
       
  Commercial Bank Underwriter   Investment Bank Underwriter  
       
Intercept 77.753 75.301 74.538 59.436 60.427 60.067 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Letter of credit 4.971 
 2.551 -6.128***  -6.586***
 (.209)  (0.511) (.003)  (.003) 
       
Reputation 
 -8.255*** -8.031***  0.115 -0.125 
  (.001) (.001)  (.515) (.509) 
       
Supply -0.750*** -0.457** -0.464* -0.716*** -0.731*** 0.731***
 (.001) (.047) (.054) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Issue size 0.006** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (.041) (.004) (.004) (.576) (.996) (.517) 
       
Maturity 0.024* 0.022* 0.023* 0.014** 0.016*** 0.015** 
 (.084) (.087) (.082) (.018) (.007) (.015) 
       
Rating -1.718*** -1.578*** -1.542*** -1.603*** -1.652*** -1.606***
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
List -1.777 -3.513 -1.592 -0.550 1.084 0.549 
 (.614) (.156) (.673) (.656) (.372) (.656) 
       
Previous -0.072 1.720 .0985 2.940** 2.094* 3.137***
 (.978) (.445) (.692) (.012) (.054) (.010) 
       
Treasury rate -0.567*** -0.515*** -0.523*** -0.333*** -0.361*** -3.332***
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.223 0.220 0.114 0.101 0.113 
F-Statistic 6.12 7.84 6.98 14.00 12.43 12.48 
N 192 192 192 811 811 811 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7 
Effect on Yield Premium with the Same Commercial Bank  
Providing Both Standby Letter of Credit and Underwriting Services 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond 
and the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  SAMEBANK 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the same bank provides the standby letter of credit and the issue 
underwriting and zero if otherwise.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and 
maturity in months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the 
numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues 
sold in the same month. PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if 
not.  Treasury rate is the interest rate on the Treasury bond at the time of offering.  All are White’s 
adjusted. 
 
    
 Variable   Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 112.152 5.63 .001 
    
SAMEBANK -6.597 2.50** .012 
    
Supply -0.002 4.66*** .001 
    
Issue size+ 0.318 1.42 .155 
    
Maturity 0.012 0.56 .575 
    
Rating 3.987 2.25** .025 
    
Previous -0.263 0.00 .973 
    
Treasury rate -0.738 4.99*** .001 
    
Observations 82 
Adjusted R2 0.219 
F-value 4.29 (p = .001) 
+ x10 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 
